THE CIRCUMVENTION OF COMPULSORY ARBITRATION:
TWO BITES AT THE APPLE, OR A RESTORATION OF
EMPLOYEES’ STATUTORY RIGHTS?
*

Joseph A. Arnold
INTRODUCTION

A successful advertising company hires Jackie on a full-time
basis. She quickly establishes herself as a quality employee and her
performance evaluations are excellent. Six months after beginning
work, Jackie faints on the job and subsequently takes a two-day
1
medical leave of absence. Apparently, Jackie has lupus and suffered
a negative reaction to a change in medication she was taking to
control and prevent arthritis. During day two of Jackie’s doctor
recommended leave, her manager telephones and fires her. He
explains that the company cannot employ someone who, due to
repeated absence, could potentially threaten the efficiency of the
2
workforce.
Believing she was wrongfully discharged, Jackie files a lawsuit
against her employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act of
3
1990 (“ADA”). It appears, however, that Jackie’s employer requires
all prospective employees to sign a company arbitration agreement
whereby all employee claims are submitted to arbitration. Based on
the precedent established by the Supreme Court in Gilmer v.
*

J.D., 2003, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., 2000, The Pennsylvania State
University.
1
Lupus is a chronic inflammatory disease that affects various parts of the body,
especially the skin, joints, blood, and kidneys. LUPUS FOUNDATION OF AMERICA, INC.,
Definition of Lupus, at http://www.lupus.org/education/definition.html (last visited
Feb. 28, 2003) (on file with author). It is an autoimmune disorder that causes the
immune system to lose its ability to tell the difference between harmful substances
and its own cells and tissues. Id. The immune system then makes antibodies that
fight against itself causing a wide range of complex medical problems, including
death. Id. More than 16,000 Americans develop lupus each year. Id. It is estimated
that 500,000 to 1.5 million Americans have been diagnosed with lupus. Id.
2
This fact pattern mirrors an actual case. See infra notes 148-161 and
accompanying text (discussing EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002)).
3
The ADA prohibits discrimination in the hiring, firing, or treatment of a
qualified individual with a disability. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2003).
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4

Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., Jackie’s employer invokes the arbitration
agreement and the trial court dismisses the claim. Under Gilmer, the
Supreme Court held that such an agreement is not only enforceable
regarding disputes arising out of an employment contract, but also to
5
federal statutory employment claims. As a result of being forced into
arbitration, Jackie may not pursue her claim in court and, therefore,
is not afforded the benefits of a jury trial, complete discovery, or the
protections of the ADA.
In the wake of Gilmer, employees like Jackie who sign arbitration
agreements often find themselves with no ability to enforce their
6
7
federal statutory rights in court. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 (“1991
8
CRA”), which amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
9
(“Title VII”) and the ADA, “” is meant to grant victims of intentional
10
discrimination the right to punitive damages and a jury trial.
Despite Congress’s efforts to strengthen enforcement of Title VII and
the ADA, courts have upheld Gilmer and remained loyal to enforcing
11
arbitration agreements.
Whether arbitration effectively resolves civil rights claims,
12
however, is a contentious subject.
As compared to litigation,
4

500 U.S. 20 (1991).
Id. at 26.
6
In Gilmer, for example, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff
Robert Gilmer’s discrimination claim against his employer because Gilmer signed an
arbitration agreement. Id. at 26-27. The Court held that a claim under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2003) (“ADEA”), could be
subject to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement. Id. at 23.
7
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
8
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
(2003). See infra note 60 for further discussion.
9
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2001).
10
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072-74 (1991).
11
See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 4 (1st
Cir. 1999) (stating that “application of pre-dispute arbitration agreements to federal
claims arising under Title VII . . . is not precluded . . . by Title VII as amended by the
1991 CRA”).
12
For analysis and discussion on the various characteristics of arbitration, both
good and bad, as they relate to statutory claims, see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Corp.,
415 U.S. 36, 56-58 (1974) (discussing the unsuitability of arbitration for the
resolution of statutory claims).; See also RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION:
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT IN EMPLOYMENT 126-52 (1997) (comprehensively discussing
the differences between arbitration and litigation, and addressing the potential
pitfalls of arbitration); see generally Julian J. Moore, Arbitral Review (Or Lack Thereof):
Examining the Procedural Fairness of Arbitrating Statutory Employment Claims, 100 COLUM.
L. REV. 1572 (2000); Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration:
Rethinking the Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur,
66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 443 (1998); Leona Green, Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory
Employment Disputes: A Public Policy Issue in Need of a Legislative Solution, 12 NOTRE DAME
5
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employees can benefit from arbitration because of its comparatively
13
low cost and faster resolution time. Others, however, argue that
Congress granted specific protections for employee rights and the
14
court system is the intended forum for the exercise of those rights.
If arbitration is not well-suited to handle statutory discrimination
claims, the arbitral forum could represent a substantial erosion of
15
Congress’s important anti-discrimination initiatives.
Part I of this Comment examines the history and development of
labor arbitration, which shows that arbitration is a favored and
important method of dispute resolution. Part II addresses the
historical status of arbitration, revealing that although arbitration was
once voluntary, both Congress and the courts now enforce
agreements to arbitrate. Part II also traces the emergence of
workplace statutory rights and demonstrates how courts—even when
these important rights are at issue—enforce arbitration agreements.
This discussion focuses on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Alexander
16
17
v. Gardner Denver Co. and Gilmer.
Next, Part III analyzes the arbitral process, explaining the
potential pitfalls employees face when arbitrating statutory rights, and
ultimately concluding that the arbitral forum is unbalanced in favor
of employer interests and is not well-suited for the resolution of
statutory claims. Part IV then details two recent Supreme Court
18
decisions, EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., and Wright v. Universal Maritime
19
Service Corp., that elucidate the potential unfairness of employees’

J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 173 (1998).
13
BALES, supra note 12, at 153, 157. Professor Bales reports that litigating
employment discrimination claims could take up to several years, while arbitration
can sometimes be resolved in a matter of months. Id. at 153. Professor Bales also
cites to a Bureau of National Affairs report revealing that companies have reported
being able to arbitrate between fifteen and twenty cases for every wrongful discharge
lawsuit. Id. at 157.
Other forms of alternative dispute resolution, such as arbitration, mediation,
mediation-arbitration, dispute review boards, fact-finding, and partnering have been
adopted to facilitate settlements and resolve lawsuits more quickly and less
expensively. Id. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, AAA Glossary of Dispute
Resolution Terms, at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15784 (last visited Feb.
28, 2003) (on file with author).
14
See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 53-54.
15
Bales phrases the issue as whether “such arbitration should be encouraged, or
whether it should be banned as yet another employer encroachment on employees’
rights.” BALES, supra note 12, at 3.
16
415 U.S. 36 (1974).
17
500 U.S. 20 (1991).
18
534 U.S. 279 (2002).
19
525 U.S. 70 (1998).
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waiving their rights to a judicial forum through arbitration.
Finally, Part V surveys possible methods employees can utilize to
circumvent arbitration agreements in order to get their statutory
claims into court. This is especially important in light of the
dangerous reality of employers requiring employees to sign arbitration
20
agreements as a condition of employment. Rather than mount a
direct challenge to Gilmer, this Comment argues that courts should at
least empower employees to refuse to sign over-inclusive arbitration
agreements. Using the anti-retaliation provision of the ADA as a
model, employees should not be placed in situations where they must
choose between waiving their statutory right to a judicial forum or
foregoing employment. This model will permit the continuing use
and popularity of the arbitration agreement while ensuring that
employees are not manipulated into signing away their civil rights.
I. LABOR ARBITRATION DEFINED: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Arbitration is a “simple proceeding voluntarily chosen by parties
who want a dispute determined by an impartial judge of their own
mutual selection, whose decision, based on the merits of the case,
21
they agree in advance to accept as final and binding.” Arbitration is
viewed as a highly effective dispute resolution process because it
offers a quicker, less expensive, and less formal alternative to
22
litigation.
Due to these benefits, arbitration first gained popularity in the
1920s among business merchants who chose arbitration rather than
23
litigation to handle contractual disputes. The most significant use
of arbitration in the twentieth century, however, occurred in the
24
labor context. Participants in the labor and employment setting
20

FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 2 (Edward P.
Goggin & Alan Miles Ruben eds., 5th ed. Supp. 1999) [hereinafter ELKOURI &
ELKOURI SUPP.]. Gilmer, for instance, was required to sign the New York Stock
Exchange’s arbitration agreement in order to work for Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23. The use of private arbitration by employers increased
from one percent in 1979, to ten percent in 1995, to nineteen percent in 1997.
LEWIS L. MALTBY, PRIVATE JUSTICE: EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS, IN
ARBITRATION NOW: OPPORTUNITIES FOR FAIRNESS, PROCESS RENEWAL AND INVIGORATION
1, 4 (Paul H. Haagen ed., 1999).
21
BALES, supra note 12, at 3 (quoting Matthew N. Chappell, Arbitrate . . . and
Avoid Stomach Ulcers, 2 ARB. MAG., Nos. 11-12, 6, 7 (1944)).
22
Margaret M. Harding, The Redefinition of Arbitration by Those With Superior
Bargaining Power, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 857, 857 (1999) [hereinafter Harding,
Redefinition of Arbitration].
23
BALES, supra note 12, at 5; see also Harding, Redefinition of Arbitration, supra note
22, at 858.
24
See BALES, supra note 12, at 5; see also Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New
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chose arbitration as an alternative to litigation because it offers a
convenient and informal method of dispute resolution in which an
25
employer and a union can quickly resolve disputes. Arbitration,
therefore, serves as a “substitute for industrial strife” by avoiding
26
costly, hostile, and unpredictable work stoppages. To achieve these
desirable ends, labor arbitrators are essentially charged with the role
27
of “peacemaker,” serving as neutral parties to interpret and apply
28
employment and collective bargaining agreements.
The advantages of arbitration make it an attractive and viable
forum for the resolution of disputes in the employment relationship.
Despite its utility, however, arbitration traveled a rocky path towards
judicial acceptance.
II. THE LEGAL STATUS OF ARBITRATION
A. The Federal Arbitration Act and Early Legal Precedent
29

At common law, agreements to arbitrate were voluntary and
30
revocable by either party. Courts did not favor arbitration early in
its development, believing that “an agreement to arbitrate operated
to divest courts of legislatively-granted jurisdiction and, therefore, was
31
illegal and void.” Congress finally voiced its approval of arbitration

Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness in Mandatory Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039,
1052 (1998) (indicating that the legal development of arbitration is most advanced
in the context of collective bargaining). Labor arbitration truly emerged at the
forefront of labor-related dispute resolution during World War II when the National
War Labor Board decided approximately 20,000 labor disputes. BALES, supra note
12, at 6.
25
See FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 10 (Marlin
M. Volz & Edward P. Coggin eds., 5th ed. 1997).
26
See id. at 7 (quoting Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 578 (1960)). In arbitration agreements, unions would explicitly surrender the
right to strike and employers would forgo the right to resolve a dispute through
unilateral action. Id.
27
Id. at 1.
28
See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 53-54 (alluding to the traditional role of the
labor arbitrator); see also, ARNOLD M. ZACK & RICHARD I. BLOCH, LABOR AGREEMENT IN
NEGOTIATION AND ARBITRATION 8 (2d ed. 1995) (indicating that the objective of the
arbitrator was to interpret and enforce the terms of the parties’ agreement).
29
This piece refers to arbitrtation in the voluntary sense, meaning that the
contracting parties agree to arbitration. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 25, at 2
(distinguishing voluntary arbitration from compulsory arbitration). To contrast,
compulsory arbitration is required by law, even if neither party desires arbitration.
Id. at 19.
30
See BALES, supra note 12, at 16.
31
Id.
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in 1925, when it passed the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).
Section 2 of the FAA renders arbitration agreements “valid,
33
irrevocable, and enforceable.” Section 3 provides that a party to an
34
arbitration agreement can move to stay any court proceedings if the
issue is covered by an arbitration agreement, and Section 4 permits
that party to obtain an order to compel arbitration if the other party
35
refuses to honor the agreement. The FAA, therefore, transformed
arbitration from a voluntary dispute resolution tool to a legally
36
binding agreement backed by Congress.
Despite its enactment, courts did not apply the FAA until nearly
37
thirty-five years later, in Wilko v. Swan.
In Wilko, a securities
32

See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2003) (original version at 43 Stat. 883 (1925)).
Section 2 of the FAA states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or
the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement
in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of
such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2003).
34
9 U.S.C. § 3 (2003). If the court is “satisfied that the issue involved in [a] suit
or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement,” it “shall on
application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has
been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement.” Id. A “stay” is defined as
the “temporary suspension of the regular order of proceedings in a cause, by
direction or order of the court, usually to await the action of one of the parties in
regard to some omitted step or some act which the court has required him to
perform as incidental to the suit . . . .” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1413 (6th ed. 1990).
35
9 U.S.C. § 4 (2003) (also allowing for judicial enforcement of arbitration
awards).
36
There was also confusion as to the scope of the FAA, an issue not considered in
this Comment. Section 2 of the FAA defines its coverage, stating “[a] written
provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable . . . .” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2003). The Supreme Court interpreted the
“involving commerce” language as “implementing Congress’s intent ‘to exercise [its]
commerce power to the full.’” Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 112
(2001) (quoting Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277 (1991)).
Therefore, the FAA’s coverage is extremely broad. A major issue, however, is
whether employment contracts may be excluded under the FAA’s exclusionary
clause, which states that the Act does not apply “to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2003). While the Ninth Circuit took the view
that § 1 excludes all employment contracts from the reach of the FAA, Circuit City
Stores v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999), the Supreme Court recently held that
the exclusion is limited to “transportation workers” only. Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S.
at 109.
37
346 U.S. 427 (1953).
33
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brokerage firm attempted to compel arbitration of a customer’s claim
38
under the Securities Act of 1933. Rather than compel arbitration
under the FAA, the Supreme Court declared the arbitration
agreement invalid, holding that the right to a judicial forum for
enforcement of the Securities Act preempted the enforceability of
39
arbitration agreements under the FAA. The Wilko Court stated that
the Securities Act conferred a right to recover in a court of law, and
compelling arbitration would not adequately enable Wilko to enforce
40
his rights.
The decision in Wilko represented the first time the
Supreme Court addressed the conflict between the FAA’s mandate to
enforce arbitration agreements and a statutorily conferred right to a
41
judicial forum.
The Supreme Court effectively overruled Wilko when it decided
42
the “Mitsubishi Trilogy.” While the Wilko Court refused to apply the
FAA to a statutory claim, the Court in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. held that the FAA created a presumption of
43
arbitrability favoring all arbitration agreements. In the “Mitsubishi
38

Id. at 428-29. The claim was brought specifically under § 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933 for the alleged misrepresentation of material information
regarding a security. Id.
39
Id. at 438.
40
See id. at 436-37 (opining that arbitration will not ensure adequate
enforcement of the statute, mainly because there is limited opportunity for judicial
review of arbitrators’ decisions).
41
The Court phrased the clash of the FAA and the Securities Act of 1933
accordingly:
Two policies, not easily reconcilable, are involved in this case. Congress
has afforded participants in transactions subject to its legislative power
an opportunity generally to secure prompt, economical and adequate
solution of controversies through arbitration if the parties are willing to
accept less certainty of legally correct adjustment. On the other hand,
it has enacted the Securities Act to protect the rights of investors and
has forbidden a waiver of any of those rights. Recognizing the
advantages that prior agreements for arbitration may provide for the
solution of commercial controversies, we decide that the intention of
Congress concerning the sale of securities is better carried out by
holding invalid such an agreement for arbitration of issues arising
under the Act.
Id. at 438.
42
The trilogy consists of Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614 (1985); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); and
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
43
Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 626 (stating that the FAA requires courts to
rigorously enforce arbitration agreements, and “[t]here is no reason to depart from
these guidelines where a party bound by an arbitration agreement raises claims
founded on statutory rights”). The “presumption doctrine” was based on two
assumptions: 1) an arbitration agreement does not waive substantive rights as the
Wilko Court suggested, but rather submits those rights to an alternative forum; and 2)
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Trilogy,” the Court enforced agreements to arbitrate statutory claims
44
45
46
based on antitrust, securities, and racketeering laws. In Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., decided in 1985, the Court
ruled that the FAA allowed for the arbitration of statutory claims
unless Congress clearly indicated otherwise in the statutory
47
language. In Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., the last
decision in the trilogy, the Court specifically overruled Wilko, holding
that the arbitration agreement precluded a Securities Act claim from
48
being heard in a judicial forum.
While the FAA sat virtually dormant until the “Mitsubishi
Trilogy,” industrial corporations and unions began incorporating
49
arbitration clauses into collective bargaining agreements (CBAs).
For the first time, the Supreme Court officially endorsed arbitration
50
in the labor setting in the “Steelworkers Trilogy” of 1960. In all three
cases, the Court enforced agreements to arbitrate contained in
union-management negotiated CBAs and approved the arbitration
51
process for the resolution of disputes arising under those CBAs. In
the “Steelworkers Trilogy,” the Court created an “irrebuttable
presumption” that employer-union disputes were arbitrable and
discouraged judicial intervention in employment disputes governed
arbitrators are capable of deciding statutory issues. See BALES, supra note 12, at 24-25
(citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 626-28).
44
See Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 638.
45
Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 485.
46
McMahon, 482 U.S. at 242.
47
Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628.
48
Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 485.
49
For example, the “Steelworkers Trilogy,” discussed infra at notes 50-52 and
accompanying text, all dealt with union-employer negotiated arbitration agreements
in 1960.
50
The trilogy consists of United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960); and United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
51
In United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), the
Court held that an arbitrator’s decision on the merits should not be disturbed by a
reviewing court, and that arbitrators do not have to explain their reasoning for giving
awards. 363 U.S. at 596-98. In Warrior & Gulf Navigation, the collective bargaining
agreement provided for arbitration of differences relating to the meaning and
application of provisions of the contract, but excepted from arbitration matters
which were “strictly a function of management.” 363 U.S. at 576. The Court showed
its strong preference for arbitration by holding that doubts as to the scope of
arbitration should be resolved in favor of coverage. Id. at 582-83. In Amercian
Manufacturing, the circuit court upheld an employer’s refusal to arbitrate a grievance
because the court found the complaint frivolous. 363 U.S. at 566. The Supreme
Court, however, compelled arbitration of the complaint, noting that it is not the job
of courts to review the merits of the claim, but rather to enforce the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement, which called for arbitration. 363 U.S. at 567-68.
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52

by an arbitration agreement.

B. The Development of Statutory Rights in the Workplace
53

Aside from the National Labor Relations Act of 1935
(“NLRA”)—which developed a regulatory scheme for union activity
and collective bargaining—federal and state government refrained
from intervening in labor-management relations in the early
54
twentieth century. Accordingly, unions were the primary source of
55
employees’ rights. Union membership peaked in the mid-1950s, as
many employees sought the protection of unions to ensure workplace
56
benefits and rights.
As the civil rights movement swept across America, the
employer-employee relationship witnessed a substantial level of
57
government intervention in the form of federal regulation. The
52

BALES, supra note 12, at 20.
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2003).
54
See BALES, supra note 12, at 7 (examining the history of employment legislation
and noting that statutory protection for nonunion workers did not really begin until
1963).
55
See CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE? 36 (1993) (stating “unions were
able to lobby successfully for statutes prohibiting employment discrimination,
enhancing employment health and safety, and protecting employee pension and
welfare funds”).
56
In 1954, union membership constituted approximately thirty-five percent of
the workforce. CRAVER, supra note 55, at 34-35. Although the absolute number of
union members increased slightly from the mid-1950s to 1980, where it peaked at
twenty-two million, the overall percentage of the unionized workforce declined to
twenty percent by 1983. Id. at 35; see also HANDBOOK OF U.S. LABOR STATISTICS (Eva E.
Jacobs ed., 4th ed. 2000). Union density continued to decline throughout the 1980s
and 1990s, steadily dropping to 13.2 percent in 2002, representing approximately
sixteen million workers. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Union Members Summary, at
www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2003) (on file with
author).
57
See, e.g., the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (preventing wage discrimination on the
basis of sex), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2002); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(discussed infra note 60), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2002); the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (preventing workplace discrimination on the basis of age), 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2002); the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (setting
guidelines for workplace safety), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (2002); the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 (setting guidelines for providing equal opportunities to individuals with
disabilities), 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-961 (2002); the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (protecting employee pension benefits), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2002);
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (proscribing workplace discrimination on
the basis of childbirth, pregnancy, and related medical conditions), 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(k) (2002); the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1101-8913 (2002);
the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (prohibiting, with limited
exceptions, the use of lie detector and polygraph tests), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-09 (2002);
the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (discussed supra note 3), 42 U.S.C. §§
12101-213 (2002); the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (providing victims of workplace
53
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58

Equal Pay Act of 1963 marked the beginning of a congressional
trend towards ending workplace discrimination and creating equal
59
employment opportunities for all Americans. The most influential
60
anti-discrimination measure is Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
which makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate with respect
to hiring, firing, or other aspects of employment on the basis of race,
61
color, religion, sex, and national origin.
In addition, Congress
62
enacted both the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”)
in 1967 to combat workplace discrimination on the basis of age, and
63
the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990 to prohibit employment
discrimination on the basis of a disability.
64
Before 1991, Title VII claimants were not entitled to jury trials.
discrimination the right to a jury trial and for damages in the case of intentional
discrimination), 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2002); the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
(requiring employers to grant leave to their employees for family and medical
emergencies), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2002).; See also BALES, supra note 12, at 7.
58
29 U.S.C. § 206 (1994). The Equal Pay Act, for instance, created the concept
of equal pay for equal work by prohibiting wage discrimination on the basis of
gender. See id.
59
Employment legislation actually began in 1908 with the Federal Employers’
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.S. §§ 51-60 (2003), a workers’ compensation statute regulating
the remedies available for employees of common carriers. BALES, supra note 12, at 7.
The Fair Labor Standards Act was passed in 1938, also prior to the civil-rights
inspired federal regulation of the workplace. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2002). Despite
some federal intervention prior to 1963, the Equal Pay Act represented the first of
many anti-discrimination statutes which regulate employer activities in many areas
that were previously untouched. BALES, supra note 12, at 7 (stating that statutory
protection for nonunion workers began “in earnest” in 1963).
60
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2001); see also BALES, supra note 12, at 7 (referring to
Title VII of the CRA of 1964 as the “watershed” event for Congress in federal
employment legislation). Title VII states:
Employer practices. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer–
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2001).
61
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2001).
62
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2001).
63
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2001); see also supra note 3.
64
HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE 109 (3d ed. 2001).
Victims of racial discrimination could be heard before a jury pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
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Title VII was silent on the issue and in subsequent years, the Supreme
65
Court assumed that the right to a jury trial did not exist. After
deciding that Title VII needed a damages remedy, Congress passed
66
the 1991 CRA. Under the Act, victims of discrimination under both
Title VII and the ADA have the right to a jury trial, compensatory
67
damages, and punitive damages.
C. The Arbitration of Statutory Law Revisited: Post Civil Rights
Movement
The “Steelworkers Trilogy” placed a presumption of arbitrability
on all claims arising under collective bargaining agreements, thus
68
validating the use of arbitration for employment disputes.
The
modern development of statutory protections for civil rights in the
workplace represents a new class of individual rights which exist
regardless of whether an employee is unionized, and without regard
to what is contained in any union-negotiated collective bargaining
agreement. The “Steelworkers Trilogy,” however, did not consider
whether these rights were arbitrable.
Two influential Supreme Court cases addressed the issue of
whether statutory employment claims can be compelled to
arbitration, and an analysis of both cases frames the debate that still
69
exists today. The arbitrability of statutory claims arose for the first
time in the employment context in Alexander v. Gardner Denver
70
Company. Harrell Alexander, Sr., employed by Gardner-Denver Co.
as a drill operator, believed the company fired him because he was
71
black.
After unsuccessfully pursuing a grievance for wrongful

1981 (2002), but all other victims of discrimination did not have the right to a jury
trial before 1991. Id.
65
Id. at 110.
66
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); see also
PERRITT, JR., supra note 64, at 110-11 (discussing the various committee reports that
Congress relied on when drafting the amendment, which indicate the main focus of
the act was to strengthen Title VII remedies).
67
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071 § 1072-74
(1991). Section 102 states: “If a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive
damages under this section-(1) any party may demand a trial by jury.” Id.; see also
Karen Halverson, Arbitration and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 445,
471-72 (1999) (breaking down in a very cohesive manner the various ways in which
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 strengthened both Title VII and the ADA).
68
See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
69
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
70
415 U.S. 36 (1974).
71
Id. at 43.
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72

discharge in arbitration, Alexander brought a claim for unlawful
73
discrimination under Title VII. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the
claim, holding Alexander bound by the arbitral decision and
74
therefore precluded from pursuing a Title VII claim in court.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed in favor of
75
Alexander. The Court noted that the consequence of the lower
courts’ decisions was to “deprive [Alexander] of his statutory right to
76
attempt to establish his claim in a federal court.” The Court held
that Title VII provides an individual with independent statutory
77
rights, enforcement of which is vested with the federal courts. The
Court observed that the individual private right of action was “an
78
essential means of obtaining judicial enforcement of Title VII . . .”
and that “there can be no prospective waiver of an employee’s rights
79
under Title VII.”
The Court stated that the arbitral forum was designed to resolve
contract rights and was not appropriate for the resolution of federal
80
statutory rights guaranteed by Title VII. Although Gardner-Denver
addressed a Title VII claim, the Court has broadly interpreted the
decision, applying it to other federal anti-discrimination statutes as
81
well.
The “Mitsubishi Trilogy” cases, handed down in 1985, 1987, and
72

Id. at 39-40, 42-43. Alexander’s grievance was based on a provision in the CBA
stating that an employee could only be discharged for “proper cause.” Id. at 39. The
arbitrator ruled against Alexander, deciding that he had been discharged for “just
cause,” namely the production of too many defective parts. Id. at 42.
73
Id. at 42.
74
Id. at 43.
75
Id.
76
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 56.
77
Id. at 44.
78
Id. at 45.
79
Id. at 51.
80
Id. at 53-54. In reconciling this holding with the prevailing congressional
attitude favoring arbitration, the Court said:
the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes and the federal
policy against discriminatory employment practices can best be
accommodated by permitting an employee to pursue fully both his
remedy under the grievance-arbitration clause of a collectivebargaining agreement and his cause of action under Title VII.
Id. at 59-60.
81
See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981)
(holding that arbitration of an employee grievance pursuant to the CBA did not
preclude a claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act); see also McDonald v. City of
West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 289 (1984) (extending Gardner-Denver to claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983).
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1989, represented a strong shift by the court in its views concerning
arbitration and the role of the FAA. In the trilogy, the Supreme
Court interpreted the FAA as creating a presumption of
arbitrability—even when it results in statutory claims being compelled
82
to an arbitral forum.
In Gardner-Denver, however, the Court
conclusively identified the judicial forum, and not the arbitration
process, as the appropriate forum for the resolution of statutory
83
employment discrimination claims. It was, thus, unclear whether
the Supreme Court effectively carved out its own exception to the
FAA for statutory employment claims.
The Supreme Court resolved its apparent conflict in the 1991
84
landmark decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. Gilmer,
fired at age sixty-two, filed a lawsuit in federal court alleging he had
been unlawfully discharged based on his age in violation of the
85
ADEA.
In response, Interstate filed a motion to compel
86
arbitration.
Prior to beginning employment, Interstate required
Gilmer to register as a securities representative with several stock
87
exchanges. Importantly, the New York Stock Exchange’s (“NYSE”)
application required Gilmer to arbitrate “any dispute, claim, or
88
controversy” arising out of his employment with Interstate.
The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, finding
“nothing in the text, legislative history, or underlying purposes of the
ADEA indicating a congressional intent to preclude enforcement of
arbitration agreements,” dismissed Gilmer’s suit in favor of
89
arbitration.
82

See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
See Robert J. Lewton, Are Mandatory, Binding Arbitration Requirements a Viable
Solution for Employers Seeking to Avoid Litigating Statutory Employment Discriminations
Claims?, 59 ALB. L. REV. 991, 1010 (1996) (stating that Gardner-Denver and its progeny
stand for the proposition “that binding arbitration is inferior to the judicial process
for resolving statutory employment discrimination claims”); see also Gardner-Denver,
415 U.S. at 56 (stating that arbitration is an “inappropriate forum for the final
resolution of rights created by Title VII”).
84
500 U.S. 20 (1991).
85
Id. at 23-24.
86
Id. at 24.
87
Id. at 23.
88
Id. To clarify the connection between the NYSE arbitration agreement and
how it applied to Gilmer’s relationship with Interstate, NYSE Rule 347 is instructive.
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23. The Rule required arbitration of “any controversy between a
registered representative and any member or member organization arising out of the
employment or termination of employment of such registered representative.” Id.
89
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 197 (4th Cir. 1990).
The circuit decision reversed the district court, which originally denied the motion
to compel arbitration in reliance on Gardner-Denver, holding that ADEA claimants
cannot waive a judicial forum. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
83

1220

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33:1207

The Supreme Court affirmed, extending the “presumption of
arbitrability” announced in the “Mitsubishi Trilogy” to include
statutory employment discrimination claims, specifically ADEA
90
claims. This decision represented the first time the Supreme Court
“held that a statutory civil rights claim can be subjected to mandatory
91
arbitration.”
The Gilmer decision departs from the Gardner-Denver policy
against enforcing mandatory arbitration agreements as applied to
statutory claims. The Court, however, did not expressly overrule
92
Gardner-Denver. The Court instead distinguished the case because
Gardner-Denver involved a collective bargaining agreement, while
Gilmer enforced an arbitration clause in an individual employment
93
contract. In light of that important difference, Gilmer sent a clear
message to employers that arbitration agreements in individual
employment contracts will result in the arbitration of all claims, even
those based on federal statutes.
Gilmer indicates that the Court is comfortable with the resolution
94
of statutory claims in the arbitral forum. A brief analysis of the
inner-workings of the arbitral process, however, reveals that
arbitration may not be well-suited to carry out statutory law in a fair
manner.
III. THE ARBITRATION PROCESS: AN APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS?
The numerous benefits of the arbitral process, such as quicker
resolution of disputes at lower costs, validate the congressional policy
embodied in the FAA favoring arbitration as a legitimate means of
95
alternative dispute resolution.
90

Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-27.
See Green, supra note 12, at 173.
92
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33-35 (distinguishing the cases on various grounds).
93
Id. at 35. Apparently, the Gilmer Court found merit in the Gardner-Denver
Court’s concern that unionized claimants are represented by their union
representatives in arbitration proceedings, which may result in the pursuit of union
interests rather than vindicating the interests of the individual employee. Id.
Furthermore, Gilmer distinguished the cases because Gardner-Denver was not
decided under the FAA. Id.; see also Theodore St. Antoine, The Changing Role of Labor
Arbitration, 76 IND. L.J. 83, 87 (2001).
94
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (“[B]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party
does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors
Corp., 473 U.S. at 628).
95
Among the most important is the speed and efficiency with which arbitration is
conducted, especially when compared to the slow progression of employment
91
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Nevertheless, despite the advantages of arbitration, it may come
96
at too substantial a cost to employees. Courts continue to debate
the adequacy of the arbitration process for the resolution of statutory
97
employment claims. The Gardner-Denver Court, for example, voiced
its skepticism of arbitration when it stated that “[a]rbitral procedures,
while well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes, make
arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final
98
resolution of rights created by Title VII.”
The Gilmer Court
responded, however, by stating “such generalized attacks on
arbitration” are “far out of step with our current strong endorsement
99
of [arbitration].”
Gilmer, therefore, rejected the challenges “as
100
insufficient to preclude arbitration of statutory claims.” The Gilmer
disputes through the overburdened court systems. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note
25, at 10-13. According to Elkouri & Elkouri, arbitration can resolve cases in just a
few days. Id. at 13. A statistical report from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service, however, reveals that the average length of time between the filing of a
grievance and an arbitrator’s decision in 1994 was 342.88 days. Id. at 13 n.48.
Arbitration is also inexpensive, a quality that provides a great benefit to
employees who may not be able to afford litigation or attract counsel. See BALES,
supra note 12, at 9, 157, 169 (discussing various disincentives attorneys face when
deciding to represent employees). The quick and informal arbitral process can
require substantially less time and money than litigation, thus providing employees
access to attorneys that would otherwise not take the case. Id. at 9; see also Ronald
Turner, Employment Discrimination, Labor and Employment Arbitration, and the Case
Against Union Waiver of the Individual Worker’s Statutory Right to a Judicial Forum, 49
EMORY L.J. 135, 203 (2000) (suggesting that, despite the danger of waiving one’s
right to a judicial forum, there are benefits to arbitration that may lead to employees
opting to sign pre-dispute arbitration agreements).
Furthermore, arbitration is not an adversarial process, but rather an informal
one that encourages the maintenance of the current employment relationship
between the parties. See BALES, supra note 12, at 9-10; see also Patrick A. Lynd, Recent
Developments Regarding Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes, 77 OR. L.
REV. 287, 288 (1998) (identifying as benefits of arbitration the ability to circumvent
the backlog of the courts and keep costs such as attorney fees and discovery
expenditures to a minimum).
96
Haagen, supra note 24, at 1053.
97
See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 56-58; Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-32.
98
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 56. The Court based its conclusion on the
inadequacies between the judicial and arbitral forum. Id. at 57-58. Specifically, the
Court voiced its concern for the lack of discovery in arbitration, the possibility of
biased arbitration panels, the incompleteness of the record in arbitration
proceedings, the inapplicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Evidence, the limited grounds for appeal, the absence of written opinions, and the
unavailability of broad equitable relief. Id.
99
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30 (quoting Rodriquez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 481 (internal
quotations omitted)).
100
Id. The Court stated that “procedural inadequacies . . . [are] best left for
resolution in specific cases.” Id. at 33 (emphasis added). By rejecting “generalized
attacks” on arbitration, the Gilmer Court inferred that individualized claims of
inadequacy in the arbitration process could be addressed should future
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court’s dismissal of Gardner-Denver’s apprehensions, however, fails to
allay the specific concerns surrounding the arbitration process as an
appropriate forum for employees’ statutory claims. Gilmer aside, a
closer analysis reveals important differences between the judicial and
arbitral forums, many of which weigh heavily against employee
101
interests.
One of the Supreme Court’s principal concerns in GardnerDenver was that arbitrators may lack the competency that courts have
102
to understand and apply statutory law.
Many arbitrators are not
judges, or even lawyers, and although they may be experts in a given
business area, arbitrators lack the requisite training to handle
103
statutory claims.
Furthermore, arbitrators are not bound by the
rules of stare decisis, which may result in the overwhelming
interjection of an arbitrator’s business judgment into a purely legal
104
decision.
Another concern regarding the arbitration process is that there

circumstances arise. See BALES, supra note 12, at 127-28. Therefore, it seems that the
Gilmer Court implicitly acknowledged that inadequacies do exist in the arbitration of
statutory employment rights. Id. at 128.
101
See infra notes 102-28 and accompanying text. The statistics discussed supra
note 20, which reveal a nine percent increase in the use of arbitration from 19951997, suggest that employers may perceive arbitration as being a much more
favorable forum for the resolution of statutory claims.
Furthermore, one
commentator even characterizes the increase in arbitration as a “stampede” by
employers in reaction to the Gilmer holding. William M. Howard, Arbitrating
Employment Discrimination Claims: Do You Really Have To? Do You Really Want To?, 43
DRAKE L. REV. 255, 255 (1994).
102
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56-58 (1974); see also Moore,
supra note 12, at 1589-90 (citing a study indicating that sixteen percent of arbitrators
never read a judicial opinion involving a Title VII claim; forty percent did not read
labor advance sheets on new Title VII developments; and of those arbitrators who fit
both categories, fifty percent nevertheless felt competent to preside over
employment discrimination claims). History supports this concern, as arbitrators
traditionally presided over contract disputes and collective bargaining agreements.
See ZACK & BLOCH, supra note 28, at 39, 97.
103
See ZACK & BLOCH, supra note 28, at 106-07.
104
See Miriam A. Cherry, Not-So-Arbitrary Arbitration: Using Title VII Disparate Impact
Analysis to Invalidate Employment Contracts That Discriminate, 21 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J.
267, 304 (1998). Aside from the questionable qualifications of arbitrators,
commentators also question the selection procedures. See BALES, supra note 12, at
126-30; ELKOURI & ELKOURI SUPP., supra note 20, at 3. For example, employers will
sometimes both select and pay an arbitrator. Id. (citing to a 1997 statement made by
the Chairman of the NLRB in which he questioned why the NLRB should be
deferential to an arbitral system that is set up and paid for by employers). Also,
employers are often repeat players in the arbitration process, so there may exist an
institutional bias for arbitrators to issue employer-friendly decisions. See Lisa B.
Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL’Y
J. 189 (1997) (discussing the “repeat player effect” in arbitration).
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105

is no uniform law requiring arbitrators to issue written opinions.
Professor Leona Green points out two major problems that arise
106
when arbitrators do not provide opinions.
First, the absence of
107
opinions hinders any development of certainty and precedent.
Without an arbitrator’s reasoning, neither employers nor employees
108
receive guidance as to what behavior is actionable. Similarly, other
arbitrators have no precedent to rely upon when deciding cases,
109
undoubtedly leading to inconsistent results.
Second, Professor Green posits that the absence of written
110
opinions makes judicial review nearly impossible.
Arbitration
awards can be vacated for a “manifest disregard of the law,” but
courts have difficulty deciding whether an arbitrator exercised such
111
disregard without a written opinion to review.
Furthermore,
arbitrators can avoid being held accountable for their decisions
112
because there are no written opinions to scrutinize.
Although the absence of written opinions serves as one barrier
105

See Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 57-58 (pointing out that a major drawback of
arbitration is that arbitrators are not required to issue written opinions); see also
Hayford, supra note 12, at 445 (“[W]hen arbitrators do not provide substantive
written awards revealing their mode of decision, judicial vacation of the award is
virtually precluded.”); Moore, supra note 12, at 1576; Green, supra note 12, at 202-03
(acknowledging the potential problems derived from the absence of written opinions
of arbitrator’s decisions).
106
See Green, supra note 12, at 202-03 (assessing the potential pitfalls of the
absence of written opinions).
107
Id. at 202.
108
Id.
109
Id. Gilmer argued that the lack of a written opinion would disadvantage him
in the exercise of his statutory rights. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31. The Court dismissed
this contention by pointing to the NYSE rules which required arbitration awards to
be in writing. Id. Professor Bales astutely observes, however, that the Gilmer Court
erred in this respect, as the NYSE rules only required written awards which are to be
distinguished from written opinions. BALES, supra note 12, at 133. Therefore,
Professor Bales concludes that the Court used a mistaken analysis to refute Gilmer’s
argument. Id.
110
Green, supra note 12, at 203.
111
Id.
112
Moore, supra note 12, at 1594. Additionally, employers may also avoid public
accountability keeping the potentially damaging publicity of discriminatory behavior
below the public radar. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31; see also Moore, supra note 12, at
1594. Green observes that civil rights statutes thrive on social vindication, but the
private nature of arbitration prevents such vindication from occurring. Green, supra
note 12, at 204. Therefore, Green concludes that avoiding the negative publicity of a
civil rights dispute is an essential feature of arbitration for employers whose
businesses are in competitive markets and rely heavily on goodwill. Id; see also Sarah
Johnston, Alternative Dispute Resolution Symposium: Current Public Law and Policy Issues
in ADR: ADR in the Employment Discrimination Context: Friend or Foe to Claimants, 22
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y, 335, 379 (2001).
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to judicial review of an
113
arbitrator’s decision in a civil rights case, a much larger
concern is the extremely narrow grounds on which losing parties may
appeal arbitration decisions. The FAA, unsurprisingly given its
arbitration-friendly genesis, only allows a court to vacate or modify an
114
arbitral award under very limited circumstances.
Appeals are not
allowed, however, when an arbitrator misinterprets the law, fails to
115
follow stare decisis, or is confronted with a novel legal issue.
There is a common law ground for vacatur of arbitral decisions,
116
known as the “manifest disregard of the law” standard, which has
been termed “a judicially-created addition to the statutory grounds
117
set forth in the FAA.”
According to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, a decision should be overturned
under the “manifest disregard” standard when the arbitrator
“appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but
118
decided to ignore it or pay no attention to it.”
Lower courts have
consistently identified “manifest disregard” as a severely limited
119
doctrine, and case law reveals that very few arbitration awards have
120
Accordingly, a
ever been overturned based on this standard.
113

See Green, supra note 12, at 202-03.
See Monica J. Washington, Compulsory Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes:
Judicial Review Without Judicial Reformation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 844, 850 (1999) (listing
and analyzing the grounds for judicial review under the FAA). Under the FAA,
modification of an arbitral award is only available: (1) when the award was “procured
by corruption, fraud, or undue means”; (2) when evidence exists of “partiality or
corruption in the arbitrators”; (3) when evidence of specific misconduct by the
arbitrators exists; or (4) when “the arbitrators exceeded their powers.” 9 U.S.C. §
10(a) (2002).
115
Washington, supra note 114, at 850.
116
The Supreme Court first identified the standard in dicta in Wilko v. Swan,
discussed supra Part II.A. See Harding, Redefinition of Arbitration, supra note 22, at 926
(stating that the manifest disregard of the law standard finds its origin in Wilko);
Washington, supra note 114, at 853-54.
117
BALES, supra note 12, at 136; see also Washington, supra note 114, at 853-54
(pointing out the Wilko decision’s “manifest disregard for the law” standard came
twenty-seven years after the passage of the FAA).
118
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir.
1986); see also Washington, supra note 114, at 853-55 (discussing the manifest
disregard standard and its limits).
119
In a 1997 Policy Statement regarding mandatory arbitration, the EEOC cited a
report identifying the “manifest disregard” standard as a “virtually insurmountable”
hurdle. See THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EEOC Notice No.
915.002, July 10, 1997, at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/mandarb.html (last visited Mar.
5, 2003) (on file with author).
120
In his 1997 book, Professor Bales states that no arbitration award had ever been
overturned based on the “manifest disregard” standard. BALES, supra note 12, at 136.
Since Professor Bales’s observation, the Second Circuit vacated an arbitration award
114
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reviewing court cannot overturn or modify an arbitral award where
the arbitrator merely misinterpreted, misapplied, or misunderstood
121
clear principles of law.
Commentators also voice concerns about the adequacy of
arbitration for statutory claims because of the limited opportunity for
122
discovery in arbitration. The speed and efficiency of the arbitration
123
process often results in abbreviated periods of discovery, yet full
discovery is often needed to pursue claims under Title VII and other
124
anti-discrimination statutes.
Additionally, employees are
disadvantaged by a limited opportunity for discovery because the
relevant information and documentation sought by the employee in
the discovery process is, quite often, already in the hands of the
125
employers.
In the court system, victims of discrimination may
compel the production of such information through the Federal
126
Rules of Civil Procedure.
In the arbitral forum, however,

denying an ADEA claim based on the “manifest disregard” standard. Halligan v.
Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998). One commentator heavily
criticized the decision as being a departure from precedent and argued that the
decision was really overturned because the court disagreed with the arbitrator’s
application of the evidence. See Norman S. Poser, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards:
Manifest Disregard of the Law, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 471, 478-79 (1998).
121
See U.S. Energy Corp. v. Nukem Inc., Nos. 96-1532 & 97-1332, 1998 U.S. App.
LEXIS 26878, at *7-8 (10th Cir. Oct. 22, 1998) (stating “[t]he review of an
arbitrator’s award is among the narrowest known to law,” and indicating that an
arbitrator’s’ errors or misunderstanding of the law is not sufficient to overturn an
award).
122
See Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Employment Arbitration and the EEOC, 27 PEPP. L.
REV. 1, 23 (1999); Green, supra note 12, at 201.
123
Bales, supra note 123, at 23.
124
See Green, supra note 12, at 201(explaining that access to information is
especially important today because discrimination is much subtler than in the past;
more information is therefore needed to prove the existence of discrimination). For
example, pursuit of a disparate impact claim under Title VII often requires a
complainant to provide statistical analysis based on workplace demographics; lack of
access to this crucial information could potentially defeat an employees’ claim. See
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (defining a disparate impact
claim as a theory of discrimination that makes it unlawful for an employer to utilize
an employment practice—although facially neutral with no intention to
discriminate—that has a significantly adverse impact on a protected group of
employees). Therefore, “[m]ore restrictive discovery may leave a plaintiff with a
meritorious claim unable to prove it.” Haagen, supra note 24, at 1053.
125
See Green, supra note 12, at 220 (explaining that employees need the
procedural safeguards offered in court to conduct discovery because employers
usually control the information relevant to employment-related disputes).
126
The rules of discovery safeguard the parties in the information sharing process.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37. Main opponents to the mandatory arbitration of statutory
claims, such as the EEOC and NLRB, are significantly concerned with losing the
protection of the rules. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI SUPP., supra note 20, at 3.
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employees are not guaranteed the fairness ensured by the Federal
127
Rules.
Accordingly, abbreviated and informal discovery can be
dangerously unfair to employees.
Generally, parties to an agreement choose arbitration because it
128
is less expensive and often timelier than court proceedings.
The
preceding analysis, however, suggests that arbitration may not be
appropriate when important civil rights statutes are at stake.
Although the informality of the arbitral forum aids the peaceful
collective bargaining process between unions and management, that
same informality can undermine important Congressional
protections for employees’ individual rights.
IV. POST-GILMER DECISIONS AND THE RESTORATION OF EMPLOYEE
RIGHTS
Despite the pro-arbitration climate, modern jurisprudence
indicates that the use of mandatory arbitration clauses in
employment contracts may be susceptible to attack. The focus of this
Comment now turns toward two potentially influential Supreme
129
Court rulings.
A. Challenging the Arbitration Clause Itself
130

In Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., the Untied States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court
ruling and dismissed an ADA claim, compelling the parties to
arbitrate pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in the collective
131
bargaining agreement. When the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to review the case, the circumstances seemed ripe for the Court to
132
resolve the existing conflict between Gardner-Denver and Gilmer.
127

See BALES, supra note 12, at 151 (stating “the absence of formal rules may favor
the employer because, as with discovery, procedural rules help level the playing
field”).
128
Id. at 10; see also Harding, Redefinition of Arbitration, supra note 22, at 857.
129
Subsection A analyzes the decision in Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.,
525 U.S. 70 (1998), and subsection B addresses the Supreme Court’s holding in
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
130
525 U.S. 70 (1998).
131
Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., No. 96-2850, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
19299, at *5-6 (4th Cir. July 29, 1997).
132
Arguments on both sides addressed the two cases, inviting the Court to realign
the status of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims. Wright, 525 U.S. at 77. Wright
argued for the reaffirmation of Gardner-Denver, which would preclude his ADA claim
from being compelled to arbitration; in contrast, the respondent argued that Gilmer
has, over time, effectively nullified Gardner-Denver. Id.; see also Rosetta E. Ellis,
Mandatory Arbitration Provisions in Collective Bargaining Agreements: The Case Against

2003 CIRCUMVENTION OF COMPULSORY ARBITRATION

1227

Although acknowledging that “[t]here is obviously some tension
133
between these two lines of cases,” the Court found it “unnecessary
134
to resolve the question of the validity of a union-negotiated waiver.”
Instead, the Wright Court scrutinized the language of the
arbitration agreement and refused to interpret an arbitration clause
as mandating arbitration of a statutorily protected right unless the
135
language included a “clear and unmistakable” waiver. Regardless of
the legality of a prospective waiver of a judicial forum for a civil rights
claim, the Court ruled that, at the very least, such a waiver should be
136
explicitly established. In this case, the arbitration clause contained
in the CBA, which covered “all matters affecting wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment,” did not explicitly
include Wright’s federal statutory employment discrimination
137
claim.
Accordingly, a unanimous Court vacated the Fourth
138
Circuit’s decision.
Wright is significant for a variety of reasons. It would have been
139
easy for the Wright Court to cite developing circuit court precedent
and refuse to uphold any union waiver of individual rights. The
Court’s failure to do so, however, suggests that the Court is hesitant
140
to adopt the circuits’ view, thus shrouding those opinions in doubt.
Barring Statutory Discrimination Claims From Federal Court Jurisdiction, 86 VA. L. REV. 307,
319 (2000) (summarizing the parties’ arguments on appeal). The Court did, in fact,
question whether Gardner-Denver survived Gilmer. Wright, 525 U.S. at 79-81. The
Court remained neutral, however, and was hesitant to adopt or overrule either
decision. Id.
133
Wright, 525 U.S. at 76.
134
Id. at 77. As to reconciling the two decisions, the Court observed that Gilmer’s
presumption of arbitrability is strong, but at the same time, the presumption should
only apply to an arbitrator’s interpretation of the terms of the CBA. Id. at 79.
135
Id. at 80.
136
Id. at 79-80.
137
Id. at 81. The Court indicated that to satisfy the clear and unmistakable
standard, it was looking for specific incorporation of statutory antidiscrimination
claims in the arbitration clause. Id. at 80.
138
Id. at 82.
139
Quite a few circuits take the position that an individual’s statutory rights may
not be waived through a CBA. See Rogers v. N.Y. Univ., 220 F.3d 73, 75 (2d Cir.
2000); Bratten v. SSI Servs., Inc., 185 F.3d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1999); Air Line Pilots
Ass’n, Int’l v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 477, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1999), judgment
reinstated en banc, 211 F.3d 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Albertson’s, Inc. v. United Food &
Commercial Workers Union, 157 F.3d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
809 (1999); Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 522 (11th Cir.
1997); Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1454 (10th Cir. 1997); Pryner v.
Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997); Varner v. Nat’l Super Markts., Inc.,
94 F.3d 1209, 1213 (8th Cir. 1996).
140
By ignoring the Gilmer and Gardner-Denver conflict and adding a new “clear and
unmistakable” standard, the Court contributed to, rather than alleviated, the
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Moreover, the Wright decision relies partly on the court’s recognition
of the importance of the right to a judicial forum, a right specifically
141
discounted in Gilmer.
By scrutinizing the language of arbitration
agreements, the Court is acknowledging the importance of
employees’ right to a judicial forum by protecting against unknowing
or unclear waivers. Finally, Wright creates a new avenue of attack for
employees seeking access to a judicial forum.
The Court, however, significantly limited the application of the
“clear and unmistakable” standard by scrutinizing only those
arbitration clauses contained in CBAs, and not individual
142
employment contracts. To be more effective, courts should extend
the holding to situations involving individual employees. Individual
employees need the protection offered by the “clear and
unmistakable” standard because of their lack of bargaining power.
To safeguard employees from forcibly signing an arbitration
agreement as a condition of employment, at a minimum courts
should require the waiver of substantive rights to be readily apparent
to the employee. Accordingly, the potential force and impact of
Wright will not be felt until a future court extends the “clear and
unmistakable” principle to a non-unionized employee.

B. The EEOC and the Circumvention of Mandatory Arbitration
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) is
the administrative body responsible for the enforcement of Title VII,

continuing confusion. See Ellis, supra note 132, at 320-21 (stating that Wright failed to
address the Gilmer-Gardner-Denver ambiguities and left behind “an equally ambiguous
‘clear and unmistakable’ standard.”).
141
Wright, 525 U.S. at 80. Another potential reason for the adoption of the “clear
and unmistakable” standard is to prevent implicit or hidden presentation of an
arbitration clause to a union negotiator, who would not expect to have the authority
to bargain away employees’ substantive rights. See John E. Taylor, Helping Those Who
Help Themselves: The Fourth Circuit’s Treatment of Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory
Employment Discrimination Claims in Brown v. ABF Freight Systems, Inc. and EEOC v.
Waffle House, Inc., 79 N.C. L. REV. 239, 291 (2000).
Another proffered reason supporting the Court’s position is the importance of
union members clearly understanding the terms of the collective bargaining
agreements for which they vote. Id. at 292. Read collectively, the “clear and
unmistakable” standard will avoid a situation where “important employee rights
might be waived without the awareness of either union negotiators or individual
employees.” Id.
142
Justice Scalia clearly stated that the “clear and unmistakable” standard was not
applicable in a Gilmer setting, which did not involve a collective bargaining
agreement but rather an individual employment contract. Wright, 525 U.S. at 80-81.
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the ADA, and the ADEA. If the EEOC finds that reasonable cause
exists to believe that discrimination occurred, it may elect to pursue
145
the claim in federal court.
The interplay between EEOC-led suits
on behalf of aggrieved employees and mandatory arbitration
agreements has placed the courts in a unique position. Questions
exist as to how an arbitration agreement affects the EEOC’s
146
responsibilities to an individual employee. In EEOC v. Waffle House,
147
148
Inc., the Supreme Court sought to resolve the confusion.
143

The EEOC was created by statutory authority under Title VII and is codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1994). The EEOC is also the enforcing body of the ADA, 42
U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2003) (indicating that the powers, remedies, and procedures of
the ADA are the same as those of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
(2003)). The EEOC also enforces the Equal Pay Act and the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2003).
To preserve the right to sue under the Act, aggrieved employees must file a
complaint with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discrimination. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(e)(1) (2003). If the EEOC finds that the charge is without merit, it will
close the matter. See THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EEOC
Enforcement Activities, at www.eeoc.gov/enforce.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2002) (on
file with author). If, however, it determines that there is reasonable cause to believe
that the discrimination took place, it will attempt to conciliate the charge through a
voluntary resolution between the parties. Id.
The EEOC will issue a “right to sue” letter if it believes there is a valid claim but
chooses not to pursue the claim. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2003). In 2000, the
EEOC filed a mere 291 direct suits out of the 79,896 charges it received. See EEOC
Homepage, at www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2002) (on file
with author). Therefore, of the approximately 79,600 individuals whose claims did
not get picked up by the EEOC, all those whose claims had merit received right to
sue letters. Id.
144
After an investigation, if the EEOC determines that “there is reasonable cause
to believe that the charge is true,” the EEOC must use “informal methods of
conference, conciliation, and persuasion” to end the unlawful employment practice.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2003). If the EEOC’s conciliation efforts are unsuccessful
after 30 days, it may file a civil action in federal district court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)
(2003).
145
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2002). As originally enacted, the EEOC had only
investigative powers. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 286 (2002). To
give the EEOC teeth and to ensure better compliance with the statute, Congress
amended Title VII in 1972 and gave the EEOC the right to pursue claims in federal
court in its own name. Id.
146
The circuits are split on the issue of damages. In EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery &
Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 460 (6th Cir. 1999), the Sixth Circuit allowed the EEOC to
bring an action for injunctive relief, back pay, and damages—despite the existence of
an arbitration agreement. Both the Second and Eighth Circuits, however, limit the
EEOC to the pursuit of injunctive relief only, holding that monetary relief on behalf
of the employee was precluded by the arbitration agreement. See EEOC v. Kidder,
Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 303 (2d Cir. 1998); Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and
Smith, Inc. v. Nixon, 210 F.3d 814, 818 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 958
(2000).
147
534 U.S. 279 (2002).
148
For a more detailed description about the circuit split, see Martin H. Malin,
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Believing that Waffle House employee Baker was wrongfully
149
discharged in violation of the ADA, the EEOC filed suit seeking
both broad injunctive relief against discriminatory employment
150
In response, Waffle
practices and appropriate relief for Baker.
House moved to compel arbitration pursuant to Baker’s signed
151
application form which contained an arbitration clause.
The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the
EEOC may seek injunctive relief in the federal forum, but that the
FAA policy favoring arbitration outweighs the EEOC’s right to seek
152
victim-specific relief on behalf of Baker.
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit
and ruled that the existence of a mandatory arbitration agreement
153
did not limit the remedies available to the EEOC. The Court stated
that the EEOC has the statutory authority to request compensatory
Privatizing Justice—But By How Much? Questions Gilmer Did Not Answer, 16 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 589, 622-24 (2001).
149
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2003), discussed supra Part II.C.
150
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 807 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 534 U.S.
279 (2002). Specifically, the EEOC sought injunctive relief “to eradicate the effects
of [Waffle House’s] past and present unlawful employment practices.” Waffle House,
534 U.S. at 283.
To make Baker whole, the EEOC requested back pay,
reinstatement, compensatory damages, and punitive damages for what the EEOC
termed as malicious and reckless conduct. Id. at 284.
151
Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 807. The relevant provision required binding
arbitration for “any dispute or claim concerning Applicant’s employment with Waffle
House, Inc., or the terms, conditions, or benefits of such employment.” Id.
152
Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 812. The district court denied Waffle House’s
motion, ruling that the agreement was invalid because Baker signed the application
at a different Waffle House location. Id. at 808. In disagreeing with the district
court, the circuit court engaged in somewhat of a balancing act. Id. at 811-12. The
court ruled that Congress invested in the EEOC independent authority to enforce
the ADA’s ban on discrimination, and therefore its power to bring suit cannot be
impaired by an individual’s agreement to arbitrate. Id. (“[T]he EEOC, when acting
in its public role, is not bound by private arbitration agreements.”). The court also
observed, however, that the role of the EEOC in vindicating individual interests
“implicates the competing federal policy” of the FAA, and thus permitting the
pursuit of Baker’s interests “would significantly trample this strong policy.” Id. at
812.
153
Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 297-98. In reversing the Fourth Circuit, the Court also
overturned the decisions of the Second Circuit in EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156
F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998), and the Eighth Circuit in Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and
Smith, Inc. v. Nixon, 210 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 958 (2000).
The Court opined that the circuit court’s “compromise solution . . . turns what is
effectively a forum selection clause into a waiver of a nonparty’s statutory remedies.”
Id. at 295. Justice Stevens found the balancing act unworkable because it would
deprive the EEOC of the right to pursue punitive damages. Id. at 294-95. The Justice
determined that punitive damages serve both the victim’s interests and the public’s
interest because punitive damages often act as the greatest deterrent against future
unlawful behavior. Id.
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and punitive damages, and there is no language suggesting that the
presence of an employee arbitration agreement “materially changes”
154
the EEOC’s statutory function or rights. The Court concluded that
the EEOC has independent statutory authority, is “the master of its
own case,” and should, therefore, be unaffected by an arbitration
155
agreement to which it is not a party.
Accordingly, the EEOC has
the discretion to pursue both injunctive and victim-specific relief
regardless of whether employees themselves may be precluded from
156
seeking such relief.
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia and
Chief Justice Rehnquist, suggests that the majority opinion is
157
The Justice disagrees
unprincipled and lacks statutory support.
“that the EEOC may do on behalf of an employee that which an
158
employee has agreed not to do for himself.”
Justice Thomas
believes that allowing an employee “two bites at the apple—one in
159
arbitration and one in litigation conducted by the EEOC” is
160
inappropriate and in contravention of the FAA.
The Justice
observes that the end result of the majority’s opinion is to discourage
the use of arbitration agreements, therefore contradicting the intent
161
of Congress embodied in the pro-arbitration FAA.
Despite the dissenters, the Supreme Court in Waffle House
provides another limited avenue for employees with discrimination
claims to avoid being compelled to arbitrate. While Wright and Waffle
House evidence a growing concern among members of the Supreme
154

Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 288.
Id. at 291. In its statutory analysis, the Court also paid cursory attention to the
FAA. Id. at 288-89. Justice Stevens acknowledged the liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration, but also stated that the FAA does not mention its applicability to the
EEOC: “[t]he FAA does not mention enforcement by public agencies; it ensures the
enforceability of private agreements to arbitrate, but otherwise does not purport to
place any restriction on a nonparty’s choice of a judicial forum.” Id. at 289.
156
The Court did note that principals of res judicata apply, so the EEOC’s
remedies may be limited by the out-of-court activity by the employee, such as the
acceptance of an arbitration settlement. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 296-97. In the
instant situation, however, Baker immediately filed with the EEOC and took no
individual steps to secure vindication. Id. at 297.
157
Throughout his dissent, Justice Thomas attacks both the majority’s reasoning
and the practicality of the decision. Id. at 298-315 (Thomas, J., dissenting). As to the
reasoning, he finds an “utter lack of statutory support for the Court’s holding.” Id. at
315 (Thomas, J., dissenting). As to the practicality, Justice Thomas laments that the
decision puts the Court on a slippery slope towards effectively invalidating arbitration
agreements signed by employees. Id. at 311-12 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
158
Id. at 298 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
159
Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 310 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
160
Id. at 308 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
161
Id. at 312 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
155

1232

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33:1207

Court, the modern landscape of mandatory arbitration has little
room for change. For this reason, it is important to propose and
examine other potential developments with the hope that employees
get their “bite at the apple.”
V. EMPOWERING EMPLOYEES TO PRESERVE THEIR RIGHTS
The Supreme Court has taken few steps to alleviate the tension
between the FAA’s pro-arbitration policy and the concern for proper
enforcement of employment anti-discrimination statutes. The Wright
decision safeguards employees from hidden and/or vague arbitration
agreements, ensuring that such agreements are “clear and
162
unmistakable.” Although the “clear and unmistakable” standard is
a step in the right direction, it is limited to the labor union context
163
and has yet to be applied to individual employment contracts.
In Waffle House, the Court ruled that the EEOC can pursue
victim-specific relief on behalf of employees who have otherwise
waived the right to a judicial forum through an arbitration
164
agreement.
The Waffle House decision, however, has very little
165
practical significance because of the EEOC’s limited resources.
Thus, even though Waffle House establishes an opportunity for an
employee to circumvent an arbitration agreement, that opportunity is
not readily available.
Other avenues exist that may also help employees get their “bite
at the apple.” The FAA states that an arbitration clause is valid and
enforceable “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
166
the revocation of any contract.” Based on this language, courts may
scrutinize arbitration clauses using common law contract principles
without offending the purpose of the FAA. One such principle is the
167
doctrine of unconscionability.
162

See supra notes 130-142 and accompanying text.
Wright, 525 U.S. at 80-81. For an example of the continuing vitality of the
Wright distinction between collective bargaining agreements and individual
employment contracts, see Williams v. Imhoff, 203 F.3d 758, 763 (10th Cir. 2000).
164
See supra notes 147-161 and accompanying text.
165
Statistics show that in 2000, the EEOC filed just 290 direct suits—less than one
percent of the 79,896 charges it received. THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1992 through FY 2002, at
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/litigation.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2003) (on file with
author); see also THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Charge
Statistics FY 1992 through FY 2002, at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last
visited Mar. 31, 2003) (on file with author).
166
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2003).
167
The doctrine of unconscionability varies by state, but “has generally been
recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the
163
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The most notable example of the unconscionability rationale
comes from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
168
in Circuit City Stores v. Adams.
The court determined that Circuit
City’s arbitration clause was procedurally unconscionable because it
was a form contract, was drafted by the party with superior bargaining
power, and was presented to prospective employees on a take-it-or169
The court also found the agreement substantively
leave-it basis.
unconscionable for the following reasons: (1) the agreement was not
170
bilateral; (2) the agreement limited the relief available to aggrieved
employees that was otherwise available under the state discrimination
statutes; and (3) the arbitration clause required Adams to split the
171
arbitration fees with Circuit City. Circuit City shows that courts may
closely scrutinize arbitration agreements for terms that unfairly skew
172
arbitration in favor of the employer.
Courts are responsible for determining whether or not a specific

parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other
party.” CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 5.15 (2002).
168
279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1112 (2002). As an
employment policy, Circuit City requires prospective applicants sign its Dispute
Resolution Agreement in order to apply for a job. Id. at 891. Adams’ state sexual
harassment claims were dismissed pursuant to the agreement, which Adams
subsequently challenged as an unconscionable contract of adhesion. Id. at 891-92.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that “Circuit City has devised an arbitration agreement
that functions as a thumb on Circuit City’s side of the scale . . . such an arrangement
is unconscionable under California law.” Id. at 892.
For a similar case finding an arbitration agreement unconscionable, see Hooters
of Am. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582 (D.S.C. 1998), aff’d, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999);
see also Johnston, supra note 112, at 363-66 (analyzing Hooters).
169
Circuit City, 279 F.3d at 893.
170
While Adams agreed to pursue all claims through arbitration, Circuit City
undertook no such obligation. Id. at 894.
171
Id. The Circuit City agreement indicates that not only do some employers
require employees to waive their statutory right to a jury trial, but they can also
manipulate the arbitration process itself through the agreement. See infra notes 212213 for another example of such manipulation.
172
In addition to the specific terms the court found problematic in Circuit City,
the court also identified an exhaustive list of unfair provisions in the Hooters
arbitration agreement. Hooters, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 614-16. In Gourley v. Yellow Transp.,
L.L.C., the disputed arbitration agreement contained a clause prohibiting the filing
of post-trial briefs. 178 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D. Colo. 2001). The court found the
agreement unenforceable, because such a restriction would interfere with the ability
to obtain attorney’s fees under Title VII. Id. at 1204; see also DeGaetano v. Smith,
Barney, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 459, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (declaring that an arbitration
agreement is void for public policy if it denies a Title VII claimant the right to
recover attorney’s fees); Malone v. Bechtel Int’l, Inc., Civil No. 2001/142, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1112, at *3-10 (Dist. V.I. Jan. 22, 2002) (granting motion to compel
arbitration after conducting intensive, fact-specific inquiry in which the court created
rather lofty hurdles for unconscionability claims).
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173

dispute is within the scope of the agreement, and they have used
that authority when refusing to compel arbitration of statutory
174
claims.
The Wright Court’s development of the “clear and
unmistakable” standard is an example of how courts may construe
175
strictly the scope of an arbitration agreement. New Jersey crafted a
176
standard similar to Wright in Quigley v. KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP.
The arbitration clause in question required arbitration of “[a]ny
claim or controversy . . . arising out of or relating to this Agreement
or the breach thereof, or in any way related to the terms and
177
conditions” of employment.
Although seemingly a broad and
inclusive agreement, the court determined that when the waiver of
178
the right to a jury trial in favor of arbitration is involved, the
arbitration clause should “clearly state its purpose” and “any waiver of
179
a statutory right ‘must be clearly and unmistakably established.’”
A “clear and unmistakable” waiver standard will protect
employees from signing an unsuspecting waiver and help them to
better understand their rights regarding arbitration. This solution,
however, is merely short-term patchwork. Employers can easily
revamp their arbitration clauses to specifically include statutory
173

First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (stating that
unless the agreement calls for an arbitrator to decide the scope of arbitrability, it is
for the courts to decide which issues the parties agreed to arbitrate).
174
See Wright v. Univ. Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 82 (1998); Quigley v.
KPMG Peat Marwick, L.L.P., 330 N.J. Super. 252, 749 A.2d 405 (App. Div.), cert.
denied, 165 N.J. 527 (2000).
175
Wright, 525 U.S. at 82.
176
In Quigley, the trial court dismissed the defendant’s age discrimination claim
under New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination (LAD), codified at N.J.S.A. § 10:5-1 to
49 (2001). Quigley, 330 N.J. Super. at 256, 749 A.2d at 407. The plaintiff argued that
the arbitration clause was ambiguous and did not encompass claims of
discrimination under LAD. Id. at 270, 749 A.2d at 415.
177
Id. at 272, 749 A.2d at 416.
178
The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination did not originally provide for a
right to a judicial forum. Id. at 267, 749 A.2d at 414. In Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp.,
the court dismissed an age discrimination claim brought under LAD, ruling that if
the legislature intended to provide the right to a jury under LAD, it would have
expressly indicated such intent. 116 N.J. 433, 561 A.2d 1130 (1989). In response to
Shaner, the state legislature amended LAD in 1990 to grant a plaintiff the right to a
jury trial. See Quigley, 330 N.J. Super. at 267, 749 A.2d at 414; N.J. S.A. § 10:5-13
(2003).
179
Quigley, 330 N.J. Super. at 271, 749 A.2d at 415 (citing Red Bank Reg’l Educ.
Ass’n v. Red Bank Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 78 N.J. 122, 140, 393 A.2d 267, 276
(1978) (internal quotations omitted)). The court refused to read the contractual
language expansively, stating that “[i]f defendant wanted to . . . bind plaintiff to
arbitration under all circumstances, it should have written an inclusive arbitration
clause.” Id. at 273, 749 A.2d at 417. Apparently, the court was looking for the
specific mention of discrimination claims or those involving statutory rights. Id. at
270, 749 A.2d at 415.
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claims such as Title VII. A larger problem, however, still exists: even
if faced with an explicit arbitration clause, employees must sign the
agreement if they want a job.
As the number of employers requiring employees to sign
mandatory arbitration agreements increases, the debate on the
application of arbitration agreements to statutory claims continues
180
with fervor. A major concern is the conflict between the supposed
“voluntary” nature of arbitration and the lack of employee leverage to
181
refuse or renegotiate an arbitration clause. Many courts cite Gilmer
with approval as they enforce agreements to arbitrate Title VII and
182
ADA claims. It is important, however, to establish a middle ground
where the pro-arbitration Gilmer policy can be preserved while
ensuring that the arbitration process is truly “voluntary.” After all,
“American workers should not be forced to choose between their jobs
183
and their civil rights.”
A. The Retaliation Clause
This Comment proposes that courts should empower employees
to refuse to sign away their statutory right to trial for all potential
future claims. This proposal does not directly conflict with Gilmer,
but rather carves out an exception that protects employers from
taking retaliatory action against employees who “voluntarily” choose
not to sign an arbitration agreement. One possible avenue is for
courts to invoke the anti-retaliation provisions contained in the
184
federal employment discrimination statutes.
Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA all contain anti-retaliation
clauses that prohibit discrimination against an individual for
185
engaging in activity protected under the statute.
Specifically, the

180

See supra note 20; see also Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 8 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing to various law review articles that either
criticize or support the use of mandatory arbitration).
181
See Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 9-10 (discussing the legislative history of the 1991
CRA in which committee members voiced concerns over preserving the voluntary
nature of arbitration). Not only do employers include arbitration clauses in their
standard employment agreements, but they can also be found in job applications,
meaning that employees must submit to an arbitration provision before even being
considered for the job. See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 282-83 (example of employee
signing agreement contained on job application).
182
The First Circuit identified the numerous circuits that have followed Gilmer
with respect to Title VII claims, including: the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits. Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 10.
183
H.R. REP. NO. 40(I)-102d Cong., pt. 1, at 104 (1991).
184
See infra note 185.
185
The anti-retaliation provision in Title VII can be located at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
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provisions make it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against
an individual because that individual has “opposed any practice made
an unlawful employment practice by [this Act], or because he has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
186
investigation, proceeding, or hearing.”
These anti-retaliation
statutes exist to enable employees to invoke their statutory rights
187
without fear of employer retaliation.
The ADA contains an additional anti-retaliation provision that
may protect an employee who refuses to sign an arbitration
188
agreement.
This provision, which “arguably sweeps more broadly
189
than the first,” reads: “It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate,
threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or
190
enjoyment of . . . any right granted or protected by this [Act].”
According to this language, an employer cannot “interfere” with an
191
individual in the exercise of “any right” granted in the ADA.
To utilize the ADA’s retaliation statute, a court must first
determine whether the right to a jury trial in Title VII and ADA cases,
passed as amendments to Title VII of the 1991 CRA, can co-exist with
Gilmer. Second, that court needs to decide if the retaliation clause’s
reference to “any right granted or protected by this Act” includes
procedural rights and is not limited to the enumerated substantive
rights.
1. The Jury Trial Right of the 1991 CRA Can Co-Exist With
Gilmer
First, it is important to analyze whether Gilmer forecloses a court
from considering the jury trial right as a basis for invalidating an
3(a) (2003), for the ADA at 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2003), and for the ADEA at 29
U.S.C. § 623(d) (2003). Other employment discrimination statutes mentioned in
this Comment also have anti-retaliation provisions. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (2003)
(National Labor Relations Act); 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2003) (Fair Labor Standards
Act); and 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (2003) (Occupational Safety and Health Act).
186
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2003). The language quoted is almost identical to the
language found in the anti-retaliation provisions of the ADEA and ADA. See 42
U.S.C. § 12203(a) (ADA); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (ADEA).
187
Melissa A. Essary & Terence D. Friedman, Retaliation Claims Under Title VII, the
ADEA, and the ADA: Untouchable Employees, Uncertain Employers, Unresolved Courts, 63
MO. L. REV. 115, 118 (1998).
188
See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (2003). Title VII and the ADEA do not contain this
additional provision.
189
Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 570 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting
Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778, 789 (3d Cir. 1998)
(distinguishing between § 12203(a) and § 12203 (b)).
190
42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (2003).
191
Id.
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arbitration agreement. Gilmer decided that the right to a judicial
forum does not alter an employee’s substantive rights protected by a
192
federal statute.
Because Gilmer predated the 1991 CRA, however,
the Court could not consider Congress’s explicit grant of the right to
193
194
a jury trial contained in the Act. In Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit sided with Gilmer,
ruling that Title VII, as amended by the 1991 CRA, does not prohibit
195
arbitration agreements.
The court relied on the Gilmer rule that
“pre-dispute arbitration clauses should be enforced unless the
196
plaintiff could show congressional intent to preclude arbitration.”
The court, following Gilmer, found that the statute’s text and
legislative history did not reveal such intent, and, further, that there
was no conflict between the goals of arbitration and the goals of Title
197
VII.
The First Circuit reasoned, in part, that Wright supported its
198
reliance on Gilmer.
This conclusion is flawed because, first, the
Wright court specifically refused to rule on the validity of a unionnegotiated waiver of a jury right even though it could have invoked
199
Gilmer.
Further, the Wright Court premised its adoption of the
“clear and unmistakable” standard on the importance of the right to
200
a judicial forum, an idea that contradicts the reasoning in Gilmer.

192

Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628) (“By
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial, forum.”).
193
BALES, supra note 12, at 52. In fact, Gilmer was decided six months before
passage of the 1991 CRA. Id.
194
Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
1999).
195
Id. at 7.
196
Id. at 8. Gilmer states: “[i]f Congress intended the substantive protection
afforded [by the ADEA] to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial
forum, that intention will be deducible from text or legislative history.” Gilmer, 500
U.S. at 29 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628).
197
Rosenberg, 170 F.3d 8, 11. In support of this conclusion, the circuit court
pointed out that Gilmer endorsed arbitration in an ADEA case even though the ADEA
provides for a judicial forum. Id. at 11. The First Circuit also articulated that the
“statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function,” whether in
court or in arbitration. Id. (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28).
198
Id. at 11-12. The First Circuit argues that Wright reinforces Gilmer, yet
concludes its analysis weakly: “[b]ut nothing in the opinion suggests that Gilmer is not
still good law; rather, the contrary is true.” Id. at 12.
199
Wright, 525 U.S. at 77.
200
Id. at 80 (stating that whether or not Gardner-Denver survives Gilmer, it “at least
stands for the proposition that the right to a federal judicial forum is of sufficient
importance to be protected . . . .”).
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Although the First Circuit in Rosenberg suggests that the right to a
judicial forum is not protected under Gilmer, its argument stands on
shaky ground due to both the post-Gilmer grant of a jury trial right in
the 1991 CRA and the court’s misguided reliance on Wright, which
recognizes the importance of the jury right for victims of
discrimination.
Despite its sweeping holding, Rosenberg stated “Gilmer does not
mandate enforcement of all arbitration agreements,” thus leaving
201
room for exceptions to be made. The relevant portion of the 1991
CRA amendment to Title VII, Section 118, states: “where appropriate
and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of
dispute resolution, including . . . arbitration, is encouraged to resolve
disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended
202
by this title.”
Even though the Rosenberg court followed Gilmer, it
refused to enforce the arbitration clause at issue because, under
Section 118, “agreements to arbitrate employment discrimination
203
claims should be enforced only where ‘appropriate.’”
While deciding not to enforce the arbitration clause because it
would not be “appropriate,” the court failed to delineate a standard
204
The
to determine whether an agreement is “appropriate” or not.
court cited with approval to the Wright “clear and unmistakable”
205
requirement imposed on union waivers of a federal judicial forum,
206
claiming it to be a proper use of the “where appropriate” language.
Thus, although Rosenberg holds that the 1991 CRA amendments do
not preclude enforceability of mandatory arbitration agreements, the
court indicates that there are certain situations where arbitration is
207
not appropriate.
With such an undefined standard, the court left
the door open to other situations where an agreement may be
inappropriate, such as when an employer fires an employee for
refusing to sign away the right to a judicial forum.
It is evident from the Rosenberg court’s application of the “where
201

Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 16 (emphasis added).
Id. at 8 (citing Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 118, 105 Stat. 1071
(1991)).
203
Id. at 19.
204
Id. at 20-21 (stating that arbitration is not appropriate “under these
circumstances,” without providing any legal analysis). The court conducted a fact
specific analysis and determined that enforcing the agreement would not be
appropriate because, although Rosenberg signed an arbitration clause, she was not
given a copy of the rules regarding the intended scope of the agreement. Id.
205
See supra notes 130-142 and accompanying text.
206
Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 21 (acknowledging that the Supreme Court in Wright
gave teeth to the “where appropriate” language).
207
Id. at 20-21.
202
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appropriate” language that Section 118 of the 1991 CRA
amendments does create situations where Gilmer is limited. A review
208
of the text and legislative history of the 1991 CRA amendments is
instructive for determining where exceptions to Gilmer under the
“where appropriate” language may exist. Notably, the legislative
history strongly suggests that the jury trial right deserves some
protection.
Finding a “compelling need” to strengthen Title VII’s
enforcement measures, Congress’s emphasis on punitive and
compensatory damages in the 1991 CRA is undeniably intertwined
209
with the right to jury trial.
Furthermore, when discussing the
purpose of Section 118, the House Committee on Education and
Labor and the House Committee on the Judiciary stated that
alternative means of dispute resolution,
[are] intended to supplement, not supplant the remedies provided
by Title VII. Thus, for example, the Committee believes that any
agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitration, whether in the
context of a collective bargaining agreement or in an
employment contract, does not preclude the affected person

208

As this section focuses primarily on the legislative history, it bears mentioning
each side of the argument concerning whether or not the text of Section 118
precludes mandatory arbitration agreements. One commentator argues that the
language “where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law” is at best a
“limited endorsement” of arbitration. See Cherry, supra note 104, at 286-88 (breaking
down the text of Section 118 to show that the 1991 CRA precludes pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration contracts). Another commentator points out that if Congress
intended to preclude such agreements, the language of Section 118 is hard to
explain, because it both endorses arbitration and contains no language expressly
prohibiting mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements. BALES, supra note 12, at
52.
209
PERRITT, JR., supra note 64, at 112. The House Committee on the Judiciary
found a “serious gap . . . in Title VII, one that leaves victims of intentional
discrimination on the basis of sex or religion without an effective remedy for many
forms of bias on the job . . . .” Id. at 111 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 40-102d Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 2, at 24-25 (May 17, 1991)). Perritt also cites to a House Judiciary Report
that “went on to recount ‘disturbing testimony’ that was presented to the
Subcommittee ‘regarding severe consequences of the lack of a damages remedy in
Title VII for claimants who suffered severe sexual harassment on the job.’” Id. (citing
H.R. REP. NO. 40-102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 25 (May 17, 1991)).
In addition to the various statements made by Congress in the legislative history
of the 1991 CRA, the EEOC issued a policy statement stressing the importance of the
1991 CRA’s newly created jury right. See THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION,
EEOC
Notice
No.
915.002,
July
10,
1997,
at
http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/mandarb.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2003) (on file with
author). The EEOC discourages the use of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration
agreements, reasoning that the “ultimate responsibility to correct Title VII violations
should rest with the federal judiciary . . . .” Cherry, supra note 104, at 291 (discussing
the content of the EEOC policy statement).
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from seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of Title VII.
This view is consistent with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
210
Title VII in [Gardner-Denver].

The Committee further stated that the inclusion of Section 118 is not
intended “to preclude rights and remedies that would otherwise be
211
available.”
Moreover, when Congress rejected a proposed
amendment that would have explicitly permitted arbitration
agreements, the House Committee on Education and Labor stated
that “‘‘under the [proposed amendment] employers could refuse to
hire workers unless they signed a binding statement waiving all rights
to file Title VII complaints’ in court and declared that ‘American
workers should not be forced to choose between their jobs and their
212
civil rights.’”
Finally, according to Professor Bales, the legislative
history reveals that Congress’ primary concern was that “unequal
bargaining power would allow an employer to coerce an otherwise
unwilling employee to sign a compulsory arbitration agreement as a
213
condition of employment.”
The foregoing analysis reveals that Congress intended to: 1) give
effect to the 1991 CRA’s new enforcement measures, and 2) preserve
the voluntary nature by which employees and employers enter into
arbitration agreements. Importantly, Rosenberg and Wright signify that
the right to judicial proceedings granted under the 1991 CRA
amendments can co-exist with the pro-arbitration stance of Gilmer.
Moreover, there are no indications that these two examples are
exclusive of the circumstances where “the right to a federal judicial
214
forum [was] of sufficient importance to be protected.”
When
combining the fact that the 1991 CRA added a jury trial right to Title
210

BALES, supra note 12, at 51-52; see also Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 9 n.5 (citing H.R.
REP. NO. 102-40(II), at 41 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 735).
211
BALES, supra note 12, at 52; see also Cherry, supra note 104, at 289 (citing to a
statement made by Representative Edwards, Chair of the House Committee on
Education and Labor, after Gilmer but prior to passage of the 1991 CRA: “no
approval whatsoever is intended of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in [Gilmer] .
. . .”).
212
Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 9-10 (quoting H.R. Rep No. 102-40(I), at 104 (1991),
reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 642) (internal quotations omitted).
213
BALES, supra note 12, at 52. Professor Bales’s observation is especially telling in
light of Congress’s general assumption that it intended to support mandatory
arbitration so long as the arbitration agreement was voluntarily signed. Cherry, supra
note 104, at 289. Representative Henry Hyde believed that Section 118 encouraged
binding arbitration “where the parties knowingly and voluntarily elect to use these
methods.” Id. (emphasis in original). Also, the strong pro-arbitration statements of
former President Bush upon signing the 1991 CRA stressed that Section 118
encourages “voluntary” arbitration agreements. Id. at 290-91.
214
Wright, 525 U.S. at 80.
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VII and ADA claims with the 1991 CRA’s persuasive legislative history,
it is clear that the right to a jury trial should not be ignored.
2. The ADA’s Jury Trial Right Granted by the 1991 CRA Is
Protected by the ADA’s Retaliation Clause
At the outset, it is important to distinguish the anti-retaliation
statutes contained in Title VII, the ADEA, and Section 12203(a) of
the ADA from the second anti-retaliation provision of the ADA,
215
Section 12203(b).
The first three statutes proscribe retaliatory
action against an individual “because he has opposed any practice
made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter . . . or
because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
216
subchapter.”
These statutes require employees to engage in
“protected activity,” either by participating in the exercise of one’s
217
rights or opposing an unlawful employment practice.
Section 12203(b) of the ADA, however, makes it unlawful to
“coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere” with an employee’s
“exercise or enjoyment of . . . any right granted or protected by this
218
[Act].” Although Section 12203(a) requires an employee to engage
215

See supra note 188.
See supra note 186. To establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation, a
claimant must show: “(1) protected employee activity; (2) adverse action by the
employer either after or contemporaneous with the employee’s protected activity;
and (3) a causal connection between the employee’s protected activity and the
employer’s adverse action.” Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567-68 (3d
Cir. 2002); see also Selenke v. Med. Imaging of Colo., 248 F.3d 1249, 1264 (10th Cir.
2001).
217
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2003); see also EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton &
Scripps, 303 F.3d 994, 1005-06 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g granted, 319 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir.
2003). An employee must comply with either the “opposition clause,” whereby an
employee opposes an employment practice made illegal under the statutes, or the
“participation clause,” which requires an employee to make a charge, testify, assist, or
participate in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)
(2003).
218
42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (2003) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit recently
entertained a retaliation claim when employer Luce Forward withdrew plaintiff
employee’s conditional employment offer for objecting to and refusing to sign the
company’s arbitration clause. Luce, 303 F.3d at 997. The court ruled that the
plaintiff could not satisfy the “opposition clause” because he “could not have
reasonably believed that Luce Forward’s policy of requiring arbitration was an
unlawful employment practice.” Id. at 1006. The EEOC argued that plaintiff met
the “participation clause” because he refused to surrender his right to participate.
Id. at 1007. The EEOC stated that the employer’s “practice of refusing to employ any
individual who will not sign a compulsory waiver . . . is effectively a preemptive strike
against future participation conduct afforded absolute protection under [the
statutes].” Id. The court found no merit in this argument, claiming that Gilmer’s
216
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in “protected activity,” Section 12203(b) contains no such
219
requirement.
Instead, an employee may seek the protection of
Section 12203(b) if an employer “interferes” with the employee’s
220
Thus, an employee who is fired for refusing to
exercise of rights.
sign away a statutory right undoubtedly falls within the scope of
Section 12203(b).
Still undetermined, however, is whether “any right” includes the
221
right to a jury trial. “The right to a jury trial is a procedural right,”
as compared to the right of a disabled individual to be free from
222
discrimination in employment, which is a substantive right. Section
12203(b), however, prevents employers from interfering with “any
223
right,” whether substantive or procedural. The right to a jury trial
granted in the 1991 CRA is not merely a minor amendment to Title
VII and the ADA; rather, it represents the means by which an
224
employee can pursue damages. A 1991 House Judiciary Committee
report indicates that the whole purpose behind the jury trial right was
to satisfy the “compelling need” to permit damage awards to Title VII
225
claimants.
Thus, the procedural right at issue is one specifically
granted by statute and is intertwined with the statute’s remedial
226
scheme. Therefore, it follows that prohibiting interference with the
exercise of “any right,” would include the procedural rights needed
to enforce the substantive rights.
227
By analogy, the ADEA also grants the right to a jury trial.
Congress amended the ADEA in 1990 to provide that “[a]n
individual may not waive any right or claim under this Act unless the
228
waiver is knowing and voluntary.”
When faced with deciding the
scope of the waiver provision, some courts have ruled that “any right”

refusal to recognize a judicial forum as a substantive right permits an employer to
demand its waiver as a condition of employment. Id. On February 7, 2003, the
Ninth Circuit vacated the opinion and granted a rehearing, en banc. EEOC v. Luce,
Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 319 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2003).
219
42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)-(b) (2003).
220
42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (2003).
221
Hammaker v. Brown & Brown, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 575, 578 (E.D. Va. 2002).
222
42 U.S.C. § 12111-117 (2003).
223
42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (2003).
224
See Ackerman v. The Money Store, 321 N.J. Super. 308, 318, 728 A.2d 873, 878
(Law. Div. 1998) (using similar language to describe the importance of the
procedural enforcement measures contained in the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination).
225
PERRITT, JR., supra note 64, at 112.
226
See supra note 209.
227
29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (2003).
228
29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (2003) (emphasis added).
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229

applies only to the ADEA’s substantive rights. Rather than rely on
these previous circuit court decisions, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia in Hammaker v. Brown & Brown,
230
Inc. applied regular tools of statutory construction and determined
that the waiver requirement applied to both substantive and
231
procedural rights.
The court found that “any right” encompassed
232
all rights under the ADEA, including the right to a jury trial.
Hammaker found the prior circuit courts’ reliance on Gilmer
misplaced because “Gilmer does not directly consider the effect of the
[waiver amendment] to procedural rights because the contract in
that case was executed prior to the [waiver amendment’s] effective
233
date.”
Additionally, a provision similar to Section 12203(b) of the ADA
234
can be found in New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”),
235
In Ackerman v. The
the state’s employment discrimination statute.
236
Money Store, an employee was fired from her job after refusing to
sign an arbitration agreement which would have required the
arbitration of all discrimination claims and claims for the violation of
237
any state or federal statute. The plaintiff argued that “conditioning
employment on the execution of an agreement to arbitrate
229

See Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 56 F.3d 656, 660-61 (5th Cir. 1995);
Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 175, 181-82 (3d Cir. 1998); Rosenberg, 170
F.3d at 14-15.
230
Hammaker v. Brown & Brown, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 575 (E.D. Va. 2002).
231
Hammaker, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 580.
232
Id.
233
Id. at 579.
234
N.J.SA. § 10:5-1 to 49 (2003).
235
The LAD is codified at N.J.S.A. § 10:5-1 to 49 (2003). The anti-retaliation
provision, N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12(d) (2003), makes it unlawful to “coerce, intimidate,
threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of . . . any right
granted or protected by this act.” Almost every state has a state equivalent to the
federal employment discrimination statutes. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Human Relations
Act, 43 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 951-63 (2003); Washington’s Law Against Discrimination,
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60 (2003); the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W. VA.
CODE §§ 5-11-1 to 5-11-21 (2003); Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965, IOWA CODE ANN. §§
216.1-216.20 (2003); and Arizona’s Civil Rights Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1461
to 41-1484 (2003).
236
321 N.J. Super. 308, 728 A.2d 873 (Law. Div. 1998).
237
Id. Ackerman worked for two months as a mortgage funder/closer before her
discharge. Id. at 311-12, 728 A.2d at 874-75. The Money Store’s arbitration
agreement contained the type of clear and explicit language that likely would have
passed muster under the “clear and unmistakable” standard advocated by the New
Jersey courts, had Ackerman chosen to sign it. Id. at 311, 728 A.2d at 875; see also
Quigley, 330 N.J. Super. at 273, 749 A.2d at 417 (stating that if employer wants to bind
employee to arbitration agreement, it “should have written an inclusive arbitration
clause”).
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employment discrimination claims interferes with plaintiff’s rights
under the LAD,” namely, the right to pursue claims of discrimination
238
in a judicial forum. Ackerman further contended that this right is
239
The
essential to “achieve LAD’s goal to eradicate discrimination.”
court agreed, holding that while the right to a jury trial for claims
under the LAD “may be waived by an employee who chooses to do
240
so,” it “should not be withdrawn as a condition of employment.”
The court ruled that The Money Store violated LAD’s retaliation
clause when it discharged Ackerman for refusing to give up her
241
statutory right to a jury trial.
The court in Hammaker held that the ADEA’s provision requiring
a clear and unmistakable waiver of any right contained in the ADEA
242
included the right to a jury trial. That logic can be equally applied
to section 12203(b) of the ADA which prohibits an employer from
interfering with any right granted in the ADA. Furthermore, the
court in Ackerman ruled that the anti-retaliation provision of New
Jersey’s LAD, a provision strikingly similar to section 12203(b),
prohibits an employer from firing an employee for his or her refusal
to sign an arbitration agreement that would result in a waiver of the
243
right to a jury trial for all employment discrimination claims. The
Ackerman reasoning should be extended to section 12203(b) such
that when an employer fires an employee for refusing to sign an
arbitration agreement, that employer is interfering with the
employee’s right to a jury trial granted under the ADA. Thus, section
12203(b) should offer protection to employees who attempt to
preserve their statutory right to a judicial forum.
CONCLUSION
Gilmer and the 1991 CRA amendments granting Title VII and
ADA claimants the right to a jury trial can co-exist. While upholding
Gilmer’s basic tenet that statutory employment discrimination claims

238

Ackerman, 321 N.J. Super. at 317, 728 A.2d at 878.
Id.
240
Id. at 325, 728 A.2d at 882.
241
Id. at 318, 728 A.2d at 878. It is important to note, however, that the Ackerman
decision stands on narrow ground. In Quigley, the plaintiff argued that the
arbitration agreement was invalid because he signed it only upon being threatened
with discharge. Quigley, 330 N.J. Super. at 262-63, 749 A.2d at 411. The plaintiff
invoked the Ackerman holding to support his claim, but the court distinguished the
case on the facts, reasoning that Ackerman never signed the arbitration agreement,
while Quigley did. Id. at 265, 749 A.2d at 413.
242
Hammaker, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 580.
243
Ackerman, 321 N.J. Super. 308, 728 A.2d 873.
239
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are arbitrable under the FAA, courts have also carved out exceptions
under the “where appropriate” language. As its legislative history
clearly exhibits, the 1991 CRA’s endorsement of arbitration is
premised on the voluntary nature of the arbitration agreement, thus
indicating that involuntary agreements are perhaps not
“appropriate.”
When individuals are either fired or refused
employment for declining to sign an arbitration agreement, the
process becomes involuntary: sign the agreement in order to work.
The ADA’s anti-retaliation provision arguably restores the voluntary
nature to the arbitration process by protecting employees in the
exercise of their statutory rights.
By invoking the protection of section 12203(b) of the ADA, an
employee may not be fired for refusing to waive his/her right to a
judicial forum for statutory employment claims. The logical result is
increased bargaining power for employees, who can reject broad,
compulsory arbitration agreements and can instead negotiate the
terms of an arbitration clause to reach a mutual agreement with the
employer. Although Title VII and the ADEA do not contain similar
provisions to that of the ADA, amending these statutes to insert a
section 12203(b) counterpart could help Congress achieve a healthy
balance between the pro-arbitration FAA and the adjudicatory goals
of the employment discrimination statutes.
The ongoing scrutiny of the arbitration machinery offered
throughout this analysis is not intended to cast doubt on its utility
and value. When viewed in light of the important civil rights
initiatives bestowed upon employers and employees by Congress,
however, the potential drawbacks of arbitration appear costly.
Congress clearly provided employees victimized by workplace
discrimination an opportunity for vindication in federal court. This
is not to say that arbitration is never a suitable alternative, but rather
that barring the option of a judicial forum limits the overall
effectiveness with which these important statutes can be enforced.
Although it is impractical to preclude the use of arbitration
agreements in employment contracts and CBAs across the board, it is
important to tighten the reins on the commandeering use of such
agreements by employers. Specifically, resort to arbitration with
regard to civil rights claims should be the product of a mutual
agreement rather than be forced upon employees as a condition of
employment. A way to accomplish this is for courts to enforce antiretaliation statutes against employers for taking action against an
individual for refusing to sign away the statutory right to trial. A
retaliation claim does not represent two bites at the same apple, but
rather a sensible inroad to the restoration of employee rights
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